Skip to main content
Investors in an MSO-PC group buy the MSO, because it is the only entity capital can own. But audited financials usually consolidate the PCs anyway under variable interest entity analysis, which means the statements you produce and the entity being valued are not the same thing. Understanding that gap is most of what diligence is about.

Three views, three purposes

Produce all three from month one. The cost is low when you have two entities and prohibitive when you have twelve and no history.

Why the PCs get consolidated

The counterintuitive part. The MSO owns no equity in the PCs, so why do audited financials combine them? Because US GAAP consolidation does not run on equity ownership alone. Under ASC 810, an entity consolidates a variable interest entity (VIE) when it is the primary beneficiary, meaning it has both power (the ability to direct the activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance) and economics (the obligation to absorb losses or the right to receive benefits that could be significant).1 In a typical MSO-PC structure:
  • Power comes from the MSA, through which the MSO directs substantially all non-clinical operations
  • Economics comes from the management fee, which absorbs the PC’s residual results
  • And notably, ASC 810’s related-party guidance treats parties subject to agreements restricting the sale or transfer of their interests as de facto agents of the reporting entity1, which is a direct description of your friendly owner under the stock transfer restriction agreement
The result: the same instruments that make the structure durable, the MSA and the transfer restriction, are what typically drive consolidation. Consolidated revenue is not what investors are buying. Consolidated statements show patient service revenue from all the PCs, which is a much larger number than the MSO’s fee income. Presenting consolidated revenue as “our revenue” while selling equity in the MSO is, at best, a conversation you will have to un-have during diligence. Show both, labeled.

MSO EBITDA is the valuation unit

Deals in this space are priced on a multiple of MSO EBITDA, the management company’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Everything in diligence works toward one question: what is the MSO’s real, repeatable EBITDA?

Quality-of-earnings adjustments

A quality-of-earnings (QoE) review normalizes reported EBITDA. The adjustments that recur in MSO-PC deals:
The cash test is the one to prepare for. Pull the bank records and confirm that every month’s management fee actually moved from the PC’s account to the MSO’s. If a meaningful share was accrued and never paid, know the number before a buyer finds it, and have an explanation.

The KPI set underwriters pull

Beyond the financials, diligence pulls operating metrics, because they predict whether the earnings persist. The fee coverage ratio is the most MSO-PC-specific of these, and the one groups are least prepared for. Be able to show, per PC, that collections cover clinical compensation, direct expenses, and the management fee.

Red flags that kill or reprice deals

In rough order of severity: 1. An MSA that wouldn’t survive a CPOM challenge in its state. This is the existential one. If counsel concludes the structure is unenforceable or non-compliant, particularly in Oregon, California, or another state that recently codified restrictions, the fee stream being purchased may not be collectible. Buyers do not price around this; they walk or they escrow heavily. 2. Fees repriced retroactively before the raise. Restating prior periods at a higher fee to inflate MSO EBITDA is the classic tell. It converts a valuation question into a credibility question, and credibility is priced across the whole deal. 3. Negative PC equity propped up by undocumented intercompany loans. Shows the PC’s economics don’t work and that the group papers over it with transfers. Both problems, plus a documentation failure. See Intercompany loan note. 4. Commingled accounts. Shared accounts, expenses paid from the wrong entity, no separation. Signals that corporate separateness is nominal, the exact CPOM argument. 5. Management fees accrued but never paid in cash. Discussed above. 6. Friendly owner concentration or instability. One nominee owning every PC, or an owner in dispute with the group, is a single point of failure over the entity holding all the payer contracts. 7. Stale agreements. An MSA drafted in 2021 and never reviewed, in a state that changed its law in 2025 or 2026. 8. Missing corporate records. No board minutes, no consents, no evidence the PC ever governed itself independently. 9. Payer contracts not assignable, or subject to change-of-control consent. A transaction that requires re-credentialing across your whole payer list has a real cash cost.

What to build now

If a raise or sale is plausible within three years, the cheapest possible time to build these is today:
  • Per-entity and MSO-standalone financials, monthly, from the start
  • Every management fee invoiced and paid in cash, every month
  • Intercompany loans on real notes at no less than the applicable federal rate
  • Intercompany balances reconciled monthly and equal-and-opposite
  • An annual MSA review against current state law, documented
  • An annual FMV review of the fee, documented
  • Board minutes showing the PC governing itself
  • A clean KPI pack with the metrics above, tracked over time
  • Identical charts of accounts across PCs, so consolidation is mechanical
Groups that do these things get through diligence in weeks. Groups that don’t spend months reconstructing, and pay for the gap in price.

Sources

  1. FASB ASC 810, Consolidation. On the power-and-economics primary beneficiary test and the related-party/de facto agent guidance (including parties subject to agreements restricting transfer of their interests), see BDO, Control and Consolidation Under ASC 810 (May 2024); Deloitte, Primary Beneficiary. Confirm application to your facts with your auditors.